Ownership Rights and the Direction of Innovation Evidence from the 1983 Patent Policy Change
Abstract
This paper studies how the allocation of intellectual property rights over publicly funded inventions shapes the direction of private innovation and the diffusion of technological knowledge. I exploit the 1983 Presidential Memorandum on Government Patent Policy, which expanded contractors’ ability to retain ownership of future federally funded inventions while leaving the underlying research funding mechanism largely unchanged. Using a matched difference-in-differences design at the firm–technology level, I find that stronger contractor ownership reduced cross-technology spillovers by approximately 25–30 percent, lowered the share of technologically similar follow-on innovation occurring outside the originating firm, and increased private patent market value by 30–40 percent. The evidence indicates that stronger ownership rights changed the composition rather than the quantity of innovation, shifting research toward inventions with greater private appropriability but narrower external applicability. The findings identify ownership allocation as an important innovation policy instrument, showing that the allocation of rights over publicly funded research shapes not only firms’ incentives to innovate but also the social reach of the innovations they choose to pursue.